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1. Introduction
It is well-known that measured in￿ ation expectations appear to evolve ￿sluggishly￿rel-
ative to the time-path of actual in￿ ation. In particular, expectations tend to underestimate
in￿ ation during periods of rising in￿ ation, and overestimate in￿ ation during periods of falling
in￿ ation.1 This pattern is clearly evident in Figure 1, which plots U.S. in￿ ation and the Liv-
ingston Survey measure of expected in￿ ation over the sample period 1960-2005.2
Insert Figure 1 here
Assuming that expectations are measured accurately, the evidence in Figure 1 suggests
that individuals are prone to making persistent forecast errors. In other words, in￿ ation
expectations appear to be biased; a property that is inconsistent with the commonly main-
tained hypothesis of ￿rational expectations.￿ 3
Several studies report evidence against the hypothesis of ￿rational￿expectations; see,
for example, Mankiw et. al. (2003), Mehra (2002), Thomas (1999), Roberts (1997), and
Croushore (1997). The test of this hypothesis is typically formalized as follows. Let ￿t
denote the in￿ ation rate and let Et￿k[￿t] represent a measure of the in￿ ation rate expected
at date t; conditional on information available at date t￿k: Using this data, run the following
regression:
￿t = a0 + a1Et￿k [￿t] + et: (1)
Under the null hypothesis of rational (unbiased) expectations, we have H0 : (a0;a1) = (0;1):
1This stylized fact appears robust to various measures of in￿ ation expectations. See, for example, Dotsey
and DeVaro (1995) and DeLong (1997).
2The Livingston survey is maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; its history and
structure are described in Croushore (1997).
3For the purpose of this paper, we shall take ￿rational expectations￿to mean unbiased expectations, or
expectations that display serially uncorrelated forecast errors.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 4
Typically, the hypothesis of unbiasedness tends to be rejected, particularly in small sam-
ples; in larger samples, the hypothesis is rejected less often. For example, Table 1 reports
Thomas￿(1999) regression results using the Livingston data.4 Table 1 shows that unbiased-
ness is rejected decisively in various subsamples, but not in the full sample.5
Insert Table 1 here
In this paper, we ask a simple question: Should rejections of unbiasedness, based on
simple econometric tests such as the one described above, be construed as evidence against
rational expectations?
We believe that there are good reasons to interpret such rejections with a grain of salt.
First, as the evidence in Table 1 suggests, limitations on sample size are probably impor-
tant here. Second, we know from the work of several authors that ￿sluggish￿(adaptive)
expectation formation may in fact be optimal (rational) in environments where agents can-
not directly disentangle the e⁄ects of persistent and transitory shocks; see Muth (1960),
Brunner, et. al. (1980), Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), and Erceg and Levin (2003). We
think this is important because much of recent U.S. monetary history can plausibly be in-
terpreted as displaying relatively infrequent ￿regime shifts￿subject to extended ￿learning￿
periods. Rational expectations in such an environment still implies serially uncorrelated
forecast errors￿ but only in population. In small samples, this type of learning friction is very
likely to manifest itself as serially correlated forecast errors.6
The methodological approach we adopt here is to run the commonly-employed economet-
ric tests of unbiasedness on the arti￿cial data generated by a conventional monetary business
cycle model that embeds the hypothesis of rational expectations, and then report the fre-
4These results have been updated and con￿rmed by Mehra (2002).
5Mankiw et. al. (2003) reject the null even in their full sample (Table 4).
6This possibility has also been raised by Thomas (1999) and Mehra (2002).Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 5
quency with which these tests reject the null hypothesis of rational expectations (unbiased
expectations).7
The benchmark model we employ is a more or less conventional New-Keynesian model.
We extend this environment to include a Taylor rule that is subject to relatively infrequent
￿regime shifts,￿which we model as occasional persistent shifts in the monetary authority￿ s
underlying long-run in￿ ation target. As is standard, we also assume that the interest rate is
subject to transitory shocks, interpreted as instances when the monetary authority wishes to
deviate from its rule for exogenous reasons. In the spirit of Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), we
assume that our model agents cannot separately observe these two shocks. Instead, market
participants must make rational inferences based on the limited information at their disposal.
This signal extraction problem gives rise to a learning rule that shares some features with
adaptive expectations processes.
We ￿nd that standard econometric tests of unbiasedness using simulated data frequently
reject the null hypothesis. As expected, the frequency of these rejections fall as sample size
is increased. When we consider a version of the model that ￿shuts down￿the information
friction, the frequency of rejections is reduced signi￿cantly at all sample sizes. Together,
these results suggest that the combination of optimal learning over relatively infrequent
regime changes can lead to expectation dynamics that will, in the short-run (i.e., over short
samples), display apparently biased expectations and serially correlated errors. Evidence of
such behavior cannot, however, be construed as evidence against the rational expectations
hypothesis.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple empirical model that
conveniently captures the estimation/inference problems that arise when learning dynamics
are present in small samples. Section 3 develops the economic model used in our simulations.
7This strategy is similar to that of Lewis (1988, 1989), who studies foreign exchange data, and Kozicki
and Tinsley (2005a) who study the term structure.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 6
Section 4 describes the model￿ s calibration and Section 5 provides a brief evaluation of
the model￿ s properties. Section 6 presents our Monte Carlo simulations along with our
interpretations. Section 7 o⁄ers a brief summary and conclusion.
2. An Empirical Model
In this section, we develop a simple empirical model of a stochastic in￿ ation process that
incorporates learning. We then simulate this model to test whether the rational expecta-
tions generated by the Kalman ￿lter are unbiased. This will provide a quick illustration
of the challenges involved with tests of unbiasedness that will be expanded upon with the
development of a complete economic model in the next sections.
Assume that in￿ ation ￿t follows an exogenous stochastic process:







st w.p. 1 ￿ ￿;
(3)
where st is N(0;￿2
s) and et is N(0;￿2
e): Hence, the in￿ ation rate has a long-run (unconditional)
mean ￿ and is subject to two types of shocks: a persistent component zt (think of ￿ as close
to unity); and a purely transitory component et: Here, it is natural to interpret zt as the
current in￿ ation ￿regime.￿
We want to consider two environments distinguished by the nature of information avail-
able to agents. In the ￿complete information￿environment, agents can observe (among other
things) the regime-shock zt ￿ fzt;zt￿1;:::;z0g directly. Clearly, a rational one-period-ahead





= ￿ + ￿zt; (4)
where by construction, forecast errors are serially uncorrelated.
In the ￿incomplete information￿environment, agents cannot observe the regime-shock
directly; they only observe the entire history of in￿ ation-shocks ￿t ￿ f￿t;￿t￿1;:::;￿0g: Hence,
agents face a signal-extraction problem. In what follows, we assume that agents employ a
Kalman ￿lter to update their expectations.8 In particular, let bt ￿ E [zt j ￿t] denote the
expected value of the ￿hidden￿state variable zt conditional on history ￿t: Then the sequence
fbtg can be computed recursively according to:
bt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)bt + ￿(￿t ￿ ￿); (5)
where 0 < ￿ < 1 denotes the (stationary) Kalman gain (itself a function of underlying
parameters). In this case, a ￿rational￿one-period-ahead in￿ ation forecast is given by:
E [￿t+1 j bt] = ￿ + ￿bt: (6)
Note that the Kalman ￿lter also generates serially uncorrelated forecast errors (in popula-
tion).9
In comparing (6) and (5) with (4), it is apparent that the assumed structure of information
matters very much for how rational agents update their in￿ ation forecasts in response to new
information. For example, under complete information, the in￿ ation forecast in (4) depends
8Strictly speaking, the Kalman ￿lter is not ￿fully rational￿ in that it restricts agents to use a linear
forecasting rule. We think our conclusions would be unchanged under a (signi￿cantly more complicated)
non-linear ￿lter because ￿rst, our results are consistent with those of Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), who
do use an optimal non-linear ￿lter (albeit, in a much simpler two-regime environment); second, the Kalman
￿lter generates serially uncorrelated forecast errors (in population); and third, the analysis in Appendix 1
shows that the instances where the ￿lter forecasts could have been improved (in a statistically signi￿cant
manner) are infrequent.
9This is true whether or not we use the steady-state Kalman ￿lter.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 8
solely on the persistent ￿regime￿parameter zt and not at all on the ￿transitory￿component
et: If the probability of regime-change is small (￿ ! 1); then expectations in this environment
are almost always stable; shifting occasionally when a regime change occurs.
Under incomplete information, however, agents cannot immediately disentangle the rea-
sons underlying a sudden exogenous change in contemporaneous in￿ ation. Based on what
they know of the underlying stochastic process, they ￿hedge their bets￿and assign some
probability to each possible source in accordance with (5). One implication of this hedg-
ing behavior is that even transitory shocks will have persistent e⁄ects on the dynamics of
in￿ ation forecasts. A second and related implication is that in￿ ation forecasts do not fully
adjust contemporaneously with a regime shock (as is the case in the complete information
environment).
Note that the ￿learning dynamics￿just described do not matter ￿in population.￿That is,
empirically, one should ￿nd that in￿ ation expectations are unbiased and forecast errors are
serially uncorrelated in a long enough sample. But it seems clear enough that over ￿short￿
sample periods, these learning dynamics could matter when estimating equations like (1). For
example, consider simulating the process in (2)-(3) under incomplete information, generating
a sample of length T: If the probability of regime change is su¢ ciently small, then the number
of such changes expected to be observed in a given sample T diminishes quickly as T becomes
smaller. Imagine the extreme case in which no regime change is actually observed. This
implies that the entire variation in in￿ ation over the sample period is driven by the serially
uncorrelated shock et: However, observe that the rational in￿ ation forecast (5)-(4) would in
this case necessarily generate serially correlated forecast errors, as well as reduce the tight
correlation that might otherwise obtain between expected and realized in￿ ation. In general,
the presence of only a few (say one or two) regime changes in the small samples used to
study (1) could in this way drive OLS estimates away from (0,1) and a⁄ect the inference
drawn from the estimates, leading to frequent rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 9
We can evaluate the potential quantitative relevance of the intuition developed above by
considering an explicit numerical example. Here, we choose the following parameter values:
￿ = 0:0123; ￿ = 0:975; ￿s = 0:010; and ￿e = 0:007: These parameters imply a (stationary)
Kalman gain ￿ = 0:26: Assuming a quarterly time-period, these parameters imply a long-run
(annualized) in￿ ation rate of 5% and an average regime duration of 40 quarters.
Now, consider the following experiment. Given the parameters above, ￿x a sample length
T and simulate the stochastic process for in￿ ation. Based on this simulated data, construct
a measure of expected in￿ ation for both the complete information environment (4) and the
incomplete information environment (6). Run the regression (1) on this simulated data (for
k = 1). Test the null hypothesis H0 : (a0;a1) = (0;1): Repeat this 1000 times, record the
median of the estimates (^ a0;^ a1); and report the rejection rate for the null hypothesis. Redo
all of this for a sequence of increasing sample sizes T 2 f80;160;250;1000g:
Table 2 records the results of this experiment in the complete information environment.
As expected, the median estimate (^ a0;^ a1) in this case is close to (0;1) even in small samples;
furthermore, there is evidence of (^ a0;^ a1) ! (0;1) as T ! 1: Note that the null hypothesis
is rejected (incorrectly) about 12% of the time in these simulations at sample size T = 80;
with the rejection rate declining steadily as T is increased.10
Insert Table 2 here
The next table reports the analogous results under the incomplete information environ-
ment.
Insert Table 3 here
10In Tables 2 and 3, standard deviations of estimates are computed using the HAC-consistent covariance
matrix advocated by Newey and West, 1994. This method uses a ￿ exible, data-dependent, lag structure.
Results are obtained using the Parzen kernel, but are robust to other methods as well (uniform, Bartlett,
etc.).Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 10
Table 3 con￿rms our suspicion that the combination of ￿optimal learning￿over relatively
infrequent regime changes can lead to expectation dynamics that will, in the short-run,
display serially correlated errors. In a small sample, there is a high likelihood of (incorrectly)
rejecting the null hypothesis. As in the complete information environment, observe that
(^ a0;^ a1) ! (0;1) as T ! 1:
All-in-all, these results point to the possibility that recent studies purporting to ￿nd
evidence overturning ￿rational expectations￿are making incorrect inferences based on in-
appropriately small samples.11 How seriously one takes this small sample issue is likely to
depend on one￿ s view about the existence and frequency of ￿regime shocks￿in the in￿ a-
tion process; and whether one believes that agents in the economy can easily disentangle
persistent and transitory components in this process.
Of course, in reality, in￿ ation is not an exogenous process. In￿ ation is likely determined in
part by the conduct of monetary policy and in part by natural economic forces. If monetary
policy is reasonably approximated by a Taylor rule, then it may make sense to interpret a
monetary policy regime as a speci￿c parameterization of this rule. Among other things, a
Taylor rule speci￿es a ￿long-run￿in￿ ation target as a parameter. Based on our reading of
the historical evidence, we do not view it far-fetched to think of ￿regime-shifts￿in monetary
policy as manifesting themselves in the form of periodic changes in this in￿ ation target
parameter.
To enhance the plausibility of our hypothesis, we re-cast it in the context of a suitably
calibrated model that broadly mimics the quantitative behavior of the economy along a
number of important dimensions.
11The qualitative nature of these results is not altered when we consider year-over-year (k = 4) forecasts.
The interested reader can refer to Appendix 2, where such a case is considered.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 11
3. An Economic Model
We pursue our investigation by embedding the regimes and learning framework within a
variant of the now-standard New Keynesian model. As the model as been analyzed in detail
elsewhere, our description here will be brief.12
3.1. Household Sector







where c1t denotes consumption of a ￿cash￿good, c2t denotes the consumption of a ￿credit￿
good, nt denotes employment, and 0 < ￿ < 1 is the households￿subjective discount factor.
The expectation operator E0 will be discussed in detail below, as its form will depend on
the assumed information structure.
At the beginning of period t; a household is in possession of Mt dollars. It then receives
a beginning-of-period cash transfer Tt from the monetary authority. This transfer is related
to the monetary authority￿ s management of the short-term interest rate through its policy
rule (to be described below). The household￿ s cash-in-advance constraint is given by:
Ptc1t ￿ Mt + Tt; (8)
where Pt is the dollar price of the cash good.
Households own the economy￿ s capital kt; which can be employed at intensity ht, so that
12See for example, Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), Ireland (2001), and Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005). We experimented with several di⁄erent model speci￿cations, including the limited-
participation model of Christiano and Gust (1999). While di⁄erent models ￿t the data better or worse
along various dimensions, our conclusions about empirical tests of rationality in in￿ ation expectations are
not sensitive to model choice.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 12
available capital services are given by htkt. These services are rented at the real rental rate
rk
t. Utilizing the stock of capital at rate ht entails a per-unit real resource cost of ￿(ht).13







Labor is paid a (competitive) nominal wage Wt and the household receives a nominal
dividend Dt based on its ownership of a (monopolistically competitive) intermediate-goods








Out of this income, the household purchases the credit good c2t and the investment good xt
(both of which sell for the same nominal price). Any unused income is carried forward in
the form of cash Mt+1: Augmenting this carry-forward is any unspent cash from (8) in the
event that the cash-in-advance constraint does not bind. Hence, we have:






kt + Dt + [Mt + Tt ￿ Ptc1t]: (9)
Investment xt augments the capital stock according to:
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + [1 ￿ S(xt=xt￿1)]xt; (10)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) is a constant capital depreciation rate, and [1 ￿ S(xt=xt￿1)]xt summarizes
the process by which current and past levels of investment increase the available stock of
capital.14 The function S is such that S(1) = S0(1) = 0 and S00(1) ￿ ￿ > 0.
13See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).
14Again, see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 13




to maximize expected lifetime utility (7) subject to the cash-in-advance constraint (8),
the budget constraint (9), the capital accumulation equation (10) and initial conditions
k0;x￿1;M0. As we will discuss below, the speci￿cation of the expectation operator E0 under
which this maximization is conducted will depend on the information structure we assume.
3.2. Business Sector
The ￿nal-good, yt, is produced by assembling a continuum of intermediate goods yj;t for
j 2 (0;1) that are imperfect substitutes with a constant elasticity of substitution #. The










; # > 1: (11)
Final-good producing ￿rms behave competitively, maximizing pro￿ts and taking the mar-
ket price of the ￿nal-good Pt as well as the price of each intermediate-good prices Pj;t;
j 2 (0;1) as given.
Pro￿t maximizing by the ￿nal-good producing ￿rms implies the following input demand







which represents the economy-wide demand for intermediate good j as a function of its
relative price and of the economy￿ s total output of ￿nal-good yt.
Finally, imposing zero pro￿ts in the sector leads to the following description of the ￿nal-Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 14









Intermediate-good producing ￿rm j uses capital and labor services kj;t and nj;t to pro-





1￿￿; ￿ 2 (0;1); (14)
where ￿ ￿ 0 represents a ￿xed production cost and at is a standard aggregate technology
shock realized at the beginning of the period.15
Following a variant of the Calvo (1983) mechanism, assume that with probability ￿, a
￿rm must charge for its good last period￿ s price indexed by the steady-state (gross) rate of
in￿ ation ￿￿; whereas with probability 1 ￿ ￿, the ￿rm is free to re-optimize and ￿x a new
price.16
If ￿rm j receives the signal to re-optimize at date t, it chooses a price ^ Pj;t, as well as
contingency plans for nj;t+q, kj;t+q for all q ￿ 0 that maximize its discounted, expected
(real) pro￿t ￿ ows for the period where it will not be able to re-optimize again. The pro￿t











15The ￿xed cost ￿ is set to a value that implies zero economic pro￿ts in steady state and thus validates
the assumption of no entry int the sector.
16This speci￿cation of the Calvo mechanism follows Yun (1996). To introduce inertial movements in
in￿ ation, authors often use the alternative assumption that when the re-optimization signal is not received,
the price is indexed to the preceding period￿ s rate of in￿ ation (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005).
Since the learning behaviour discussed below also imparts inertia to in￿ ation, we use the indexation to
average in￿ ation in our benchmark model. Our regressions results are not sensitive to this assumption.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 15
with the pro￿t ￿ ow Dj;t+q given by:




t+qkj;t+q ￿ Wt+qnj;t+q; (16)
where ￿
q expresses the probability that ^ Pj;t remains in e⁄ect (including of indexation) at
time t+q and (￿￿)q is a cumulative indexation factor. Pro￿t maximization is subject to the
demand for good j (12) and to the production function (14). Again, note that the nature of
the expectation operator Et will depend on the assumed structure of information.
The symmetry in the demand for each intermediate good implies that all ￿rms allowed to
re-optimize choose the same price ^ Pj;t, which we denote ^ Pt. Considering the de￿nition of the
price index in (13) and the fact that at the economy￿ s level, a fraction 1￿￿ of intermediate-







t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)( ^ Pt)
1￿#: (17)
3.3. Monetary Policy
Let ￿t denote the net in￿ ation rate and let it denote the net nominal interest rate.
Further, let (r￿;y￿) denote the net real rate of interest and level of real GDP that would
prevail in this economy in a deterministic steady-state. We assume a Taylor rule of the
following form:
it = (1 ￿ ￿)[r
￿ + ￿
￿
t + ￿(￿t ￿ ￿
￿
t) + ￿(yt ￿ y
￿)] + ￿it￿1 + ut; (18)
where ￿￿
t denotes the monetary authority￿ s date t in￿ ation target and ut denotes an exoge-
nous transitory monetary policy shock. The parameter 0 ￿ ￿ < 1 indexes the degree to
which the monetary authority wishes to smooth out interest rate movements. As alluded
to earlier, the monetary authority achieves any particular it with an appropriate lump-sumAre In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 16
injection/withdrawal of cash Tt to/from the household sector. Accordingly, the aggregate
stock of money evolves as follows:
Mt+1 = Mt + Tt: (19)
We assume that the monetary policy rule is subject to two types of disturbances. The
￿rst disturbance consists of the monetary policy shocks ut de￿ned above. We interpret these
shocks as the reaction of monetary authorities to economic factors, such as ￿nancial stability
concerns, not articulated by the rule (18). Alternatively, the shocks could be understood
as stemming from the imperfect control exercised by monetary authorities over the growth
rate of money supply. Under either interpretation, we view these shocks as possessing little
persistence. Accordingly, we assume that their evolution is governed by the following process:
ut = ￿1ut￿1 + et; (20)
with 0 ￿ j￿1j << 1 and et ￿ N(0;￿2
e):
The second disturbance to monetary policy is as follows. We assume that the in￿ ation
target of the monetary authorities ￿￿
t, while remaining ￿xed for extended periods of time, is
nevertheless subject to occasional, persistent shifts. We see two possible interpretations for
these shifts. First, they could correspond to changes in economic thinking that lead monetary
authorities to modify their views about the proper rate of in￿ ation to pursue. DeLong (1997),
for example, argues that the Great In￿ ation of the 1970s, and its eventual termination by the
Federal Reserve at the beginning of the 1980s, was a result of shifting views about the shape
of the Phillips curve and, more generally, about the nature of the constraints under which
monetary policy is conducted. Alternatively, a change in the in￿ ation target could re￿ ect the
appointment of a new central bank chair, whose preferences over in￿ ation outcomes di⁄erAre In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 17
from their predecessor￿ s. Under either interpretation, we view these shifts as exhibiting
signi￿cant duration, in the order of ￿ve to ten years.
We express these shifts with the variable zt ￿ ￿￿
t ￿￿￿; so that zt constitutes the deviation
of the current target of authorities ￿￿
t from its long term (time-invariant) mean ￿￿. We
assume that the following process, a mixture of a Bernoulli trial and a normal random






st w.p. 1 ￿ ￿2; st ￿ N(0;￿2
s);
(21)
with 0 << ￿2 < 1:
Notice that the process for zt shares some similarities with a random walk. Speci￿cally,
the conditional expectation of zt is close to zt￿1 when ￿2 is close to one. In contrast with
a random walk however, the process is not a⁄ected by innovations every period and is
stationary. The process also di⁄ers from a standard autoregressive process in that the decay
of a given impulse will be sudden and complete, rather than smooth and gradual. We believe
that this characterization of the regime shifts accords well with recent episodes of monetary
history and with our suggested interpretations of these shifts.
Note that, by combining the de￿nition zt ￿ ￿￿
t ￿ ￿￿ with the Taylor rule (18), we can
write:
it = (1 ￿ ￿)[r
￿ + ￿
￿ + ￿(￿t ￿ ￿
￿) + ￿(yt ￿ y
￿)] + ￿it￿1 + ￿t (22)
where ￿t ￿ (1￿￿)(1￿￿)zt +ut: Hence, under complete information, agents are assumed to
observe the in￿ ation target ￿￿
t directly (or, equivalently, they can observe zt;ut separately).
Under incomplete information, agents must make rational inferences over the in￿ ation target
(as they can only observe ￿t and not the composition of ￿t across zt and ut).Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 18
3.4. The Kalman Filter
In the case of incomplete information, we assume that agents use a Kalman ￿lter to solve
the signal extraction problem. Note that the disturbances to monetary policy zt and ut;

















































(1 ￿ ￿2)zt w.p. ￿2;
st+1 ￿ ￿2zt w.p. 1 ￿ ￿2:
Observe that Et￿t+1 = 0:
The system de￿ned in (23) along with the speci￿cation of et and ￿t de￿ne a state-space
system (Hamilton, 1994, Chapter 13), where the ￿rst equation in (23) is the state equation
and the second equation in (23) is the observation equation. When applied to such a system,
the Kalman ￿lter delivers estimates of the two unobserved states (zt and ut) conditional on all
observed values of ￿t up to and including period t: These estimates are updated sequentially
















5 + Kt (￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t);
where Kt represents the gain matrix of the ￿lter and governs the extent to which unexpected
movements in the observed shock ￿t are attributed to the persistent shift zt or to the transitory




































As for the empirical model studied earlier, the projections arising from the Kalman ￿lter
represent the best linear forecasts of the unobserved variables based on available information.
However, since zt is not normally distributed (conditional on information up to date t) but
is instead a mixed Bernouilli-normal variate, the Kalman ￿lter is not￿ strictly speaking￿ fully
optimal. This implies that agents using this ￿lter are not fully rational and could potentially
improve on their forecasts of future monetary policy disturbances by using another (signi￿-
cantly more complicated) non-linear ￿lter. We performed a number of tests to check whether
this source of ￿non-rationality￿was likely to be quantitatively important in the experiments
performed below. It turns out that in repeated simulations of the model, the instances where
agents could have actually improved their forecasts in a statistically signi￿cant manner are
not frequent; see Appendix 1.
3.5. Equilibrium





t=0 8j 2 (0;1);
a price-system fPt;Wt;rt;itg
1
t=0 ; f ^ Pj;tg1
t=0 8 j 2 (0;1); a monetary policy rule, including
injections fTtg1
t=0; and expectations fEtg1
t=0 such that, given a known stochastic process
over fat;zt;utg1
t=0; the following conditions hold:
1. Given expectations, the allocation maximizes (7) subject to (8), (9), (10);Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 20
2. Given expectations, the allocation and price-setting behavior f ^ Pj;tg1
t=0 8 j 2 (0;1) max-
imizes (15) subject to (12) and (14), generating a nominal dividend Dt in accordance
with (16);
3. ^ Pj;t = ^ Pt 8 j 2 (0;1) with the aggregate price level Pt satisfying (17);
4. Monetary injections fTtg1
t=0 are chosen to be consistent with the desired nominal in-
terest rate as determined by (22);




kj;t dj; nt =
Z 1
0
nj;t dj; Mt = Mt;
yt = c1t + c2t + xt + ￿(ht)kt = atF(htkt;nt ￿ ￿):
6. Expectations fEtg1
t=0 are formed in a manner consistent with the stochastic properties
induced by [1]-[5], given available information.
4. Solution Method and Calibration
As nominal variables are non-stationary (with the exception of the nominal interest rate),
we transform them in the usual manner (e.g. by dividing each nominal variable either by the
price-level or the money supply) to render a stationary solution. After calibrating the model￿ s
parameters, the deterministic steady-state of the system is computed and a ￿rst-order ap-
proximation of the equilibrium system is formed around the steady-state, with all variables
expressed as percent deviations from their steady-state values. The algorithm delivers a
￿rst-order system in which all such deviations are expressed as functions of predetermined
state variables and exogenous shocks; see King and Watson (2002) for details.17
17Finding solutions for the incomplete information case requires only a slight modi￿cation to the King and
Watson (2002) algorithm, with forecasts of the monetary policy shocks based on the Kalman ￿lter describedAre In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 21
4.1. Preferences and Technology
The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency. Preferences are given by:
u(c1t;c2t;nt) = ￿ ln(c1t) + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(c2t) ￿ Bnt: (24)
We set ￿ = 0:84, which implies an interest-rate elasticity of the velocity of money equal to
0:20, as in Cooley and Hansen (1995). B is set to 2:6 so that steady-state hours represent
0:3 of total available time.
The parameter #, the price elasticity of demand for each intermediate good, is set to
5. This implies that the steady-state markup of price over marginal costs is 25 percent,
a standard value in the literature. The parameter ￿, expressing the probability a given
intermediate-good producer does not re-optimize, is set to 0:6, implying that on average,
prices are re-optimized every 1=(1￿0:6) = 2:5 quarters. This value is similar to those arrived
at when estimating similar monetary DSGE models (e.g. Ireland, 2001). The parameter
￿ = S00(1), governing the severity of the adjustment costs in capital accumulation, is set
to 1, the estimate arrived at in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) in their model
speci￿cation that is closest to the present one.
The production function of intermediate-good producing ￿rms is Cobb-Douglas in capital
and (net) labor services, i.e. F(kt;nt) = atk￿
t (nt ￿ ￿)1￿￿, and aggregate technology shocks
evolve according to
lnat = (1 ￿ ￿)lna + ￿lnat￿1 + vt; vt ￿ N(0;￿
2
v):
The scale parameter for the technology shock is set to a = 1. Further, we set the autocorre-
lation (￿) and standard deviation (￿v) parameters to the standard values of 0:95 and 0:005,
earlier. Details and programs are available from the authors.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 22
respectively.
The monopolistic competitive structure of the sector producing intermediate goods im-
plies that these producers enjoy positive pro￿ts. We set the ￿xed labor cost ￿ to 1=3, which
renders these steady-state pro￿ts zero. The parameter ￿ is set to 0:5, which implies a
steady-state labour income share of 0:6.18
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), we calibrate the capital utilization
function ￿(ht) by requiring that h equals 1 in steady state and by setting ￿(1) = 0. This leaves
the steady-state computations una⁄ected by the capital utilization decision. We then set
the elasticity ￿￿ = ￿00(1)=￿0(1) to 0:3, which allows our model to match the peak response of
capital utilization following monetary policy shocks documented by Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005).
Finally, following standard arguments, ￿ is set to 0:988 and ￿ to 0:019, implying a steady-
state (quarterly) capital-output of 13; an investment-output ratio of 0:25, and a (quarterly)
net real interest rate r￿ = 0:012:
4.2. Monetary Policy
The long-run (quarterly) in￿ ation rate is set to ￿￿ = 0:0123; which implies steady-
state in￿ ation of 5% at an annualized rate. According to the monetary policy rule (18),
the nominal interest rate reacts to deviations of in￿ ation from its current target (￿); to
deviations of output from its trend (￿); and to its own lagged value (￿): We use results from
the sizeable literature estimating these rules to choose plausible parameter values.19
Beginning with Taylor (1993), it has been argued that the interest rate must react ag-
gressively to in￿ ation to avoid the possibility of ￿expectation traps￿in which high in￿ ation
18The steady state GDP share of labour is 1 ￿ ￿ divided by the markup 1:25.
19Empirical estimates of Taylor rules are arrived at using various methodologies: rules can be forward
looking (Clarida et. al., 2000) or based solely on contemporaneous variables (Taylor, 1993); as well, para-
meters are obtained by single-equation estimation (Erceg and Levin 2003, English, et. al. 2003), or as part
of a system-wide estimation (Schorfheide 2003, Kozicki and Tinsley, 2005b).Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 23
becomes a self-fulling prophesy. Accordingly, we set ￿ = 2 in our benchmark calibration.
This value is only slightly larger that the original value used by Taylor and is in line with re-
cent empirical estimates; see Erceg and Levin (2003), English et. al. (2003), and Schorfheide
(2005). We set the smoothing parameter to ￿ = 0:50; which is in the range of recent empirical
estimates; again, see Erceg and Levin (2003), Kozicki and Tinsley (2005b), and Schorfheide
(2005) (all three empirical exercises explicitly allow for regime shifts in monetary policy and
so are consistent with our environment). The parameter ￿, the response of the interest rate to
changes in the output gap is set to ￿ = 0:0. This follows results where fully-developed DSGE
models, estimated using maximum likelihood, ￿nd estimates of ￿ that are not statistically
signi￿cant (e.g. Ireland, 2001).20
The parameters ￿2 and ￿s govern the dynamics of the in￿ ation target zt. In particular, ￿2
governs the mean duration of any given regime and ￿s represents the standard deviation of
the distribution from which a regime shift is drawn when it occurs. We set ￿2 = 0:975; which
implies a mean duration of shifts of 10 years (40 model periods). This value is consistent with
our earlier interpretation of regimes corresponding to the tenure of central bank heads or the
life of a particular economic paradigm that dominates FOMC committee decisions. It is also
in line with the estimates reported in Erceg and Levin (2003) and Schorfheide (2005). We
set ￿s = 0:01; which implies that a one standard deviation policy shift changes the in￿ ation
target by 4% on an annual basis. Again, this value is consistent with the empirical results
reported in Erceg and Levin (2003), Kozicki and Tinsley (2005b), and Schorfheide (2005).
Finally, parameters related to transitory monetary policy shocks are (￿1;￿e) = (0;0:007).
The persistence parameter here is consistent with the estimates provided in Schorfheide
(2005), but the variance of the innovation is slightly above his estimated range. We chose
￿e to match the model￿ s predicted GDP volatility with that of the data; i.e., see Table 4.
20Further, Erceg and Levin (2003) ￿nd only a small value (0:25) for this parameter using a di⁄erent
estimation technology.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 24
5. Properties of the Benchmark Model
In this section, we report some of the properties of our benchmark model (incomplete
information over monetary policy regimes) to show the reader that the model is not strongly
at variance with actual economies. To this end, we begin with Table 4, which reports a set
of moments describing the model￿ s covariance structure in relation to the U.S. economy. In
this table, ￿(x) measures the percent standard deviation of variable x; ￿(x;GDP) measures
the contemporaneous correlation of variable x with real GDP; and ￿(x;x￿1) measures the
￿rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient for variable x:21
Insert Table 4 here
Table 4 reveals that the model￿ s cyclical properties are not grossly inconsistent with
the data. In fact, the model performs about as well as any other quantitative general
equilibrium model along these dimensions. Of particular interest is the behavior of in￿ ation
and in￿ ation expectations, since these two variables constitute the basis for the regression
equation (1). While the model does not mimic the behavior of these two variables exactly,
it seems reasonably ￿close￿for the purpose at hand.
Figure 2 records the economy￿ s response to a standard deviation decline in the in￿ ation
target. This type of regime change initially generates a substantial and persistent increase in
the interest rate, which is consistent with what we know of such episodes (Erceg and Levin
2003). In our model, such a shock also generates a mild recession. Note that in￿ ation falls
gradually, with in￿ ation expectations consistently overestimating actual in￿ ation for several
periods.22
21Source: GDP, expenditure components, labor input (establishment survey) and in￿ ation (CPI) variables
are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Fred database, 1954Q1￿ 2005Q3. TFP is computed as
ln(GDP)￿0:64log(Hours): Expected in￿ ation is the expected increase in one-quarter-ahead CPI according
to the SPF survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (sample period 1981Q3￿ 2005Q2).
22Some readers may wonder whether the apparent biasedness in in￿ ation expectations is the product ofAre In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 25
Insert Figure 2 here
The dynamic response of in￿ ation and expected in￿ ation in Figure 2 demonstrates that
under incomplete information, even rational expectations may￿ in the ￿short-run￿ ￿ exhibit
serially correlated forecast errors. We suspect that this type of force may be one reason why
conventional tests of rational expectations are frequently (and incorrectly) rejected in small
samples.
Figure 3 records the economy￿ s response to a standard deviation increase in the technology
shock. As is standard in these environments, the sudden surge in output is disin￿ ationary,
although this e⁄ect is somewhat muted here owing to sluggish price adjustment. Neverthe-
less, even this relatively muted disin￿ ation is penalized heavily by the monetary policy rule,
which is what accounts for the brief acceleration in money growth (and slight decline in the
nominal interest rate).
Insert Figure 3 here
Of course, the purpose of our paper is not to provide an extensive evaluation of the
strengths and shortcomings of this particular business cycle model. The key observation here
is that the model￿ s dynamic properties are not unreasonable and that the model does embed
the hypothesis of (near) rational expectations. The model therefore provides a reasonably
good laboratory with which we can perform our experiments.
the suboptimality of our linear ￿lter. As Andolfatto and Gomme (2003) demonstrate, the same dynamics
are evident when expectations are formed optimally according to Bayes￿rule.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 26
6. Testing the Unbiasedness Hypothesis
Here, we repeat the experiment performed earlier using our simple empirical model. In
particular, we treat our benchmark model as the data generating process (DGP) and ask
what an econometrician would conclude about the unbiasedness of in￿ ation expectations if
presented with data from our DGP.
Table 5 records the results for the complete information environment.
Insert Table 5 here
Note that the parameter estimates and rejection rates in Table 5 are not that di⁄erent from
those reported in Table 2.
To quantify the role of information frictions, Table 6 reports the corresponding results
for the incomplete information environment. Observe that here, as in Table 3, the median
parameter estimates (^ a0;^ a1) converge quickly to (0;1) as sample size is increased. The basic
result here is similar to that found in the empirical model (although not as dramatic). For
the sample sizes considered here, the e⁄ect of the information friction is to increase the
rejection rate by roughly a factor of two. For sample sizes in the range commonly used in
the empirical literature (T = 80); the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis
is almost 30%.23
Insert Table 6 here
23This behaviour is also present when four-quarter-ahead expectations are considered. Appendix 2 shows
that in that case, incomplete information leads OLS to again reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness
roughly twice as often than under complete information.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 27
7. Conclusion
By various measures, in￿ ation expectations appear to evolve ￿sluggishly￿ relative to
actual in￿ ation. Several recent papers report econometric evidence of an apparent bias in
in￿ ation expectations. These ￿ndings are commonly interpreted as constituting evidence
that overturns the rational expectations hypothesis. Our analysis casts some doubt on the
validity of such an interpretation.
Our main message can be summarized as follows. To the extent that U.S. monetary
policy in the recent past has been characterized by ￿regime shifts￿subject to ￿adaptive￿
(but rational) learning, the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null of unbiasedness is
not insigni￿cant (roughly in the order of 30%), given the sample sizes that are commonly
employed in these tests.
Of course, to believe that our argument is empirically relevant, one must adopt the
view that monetary policy is characterized by regime shifts in a world where the monetary
authority is either unwilling or unable to signal its new objective in a credible and timely
manner to market participants. If one was instead to adopt the view that sudden changes in
policy are, for the most part, readily communicated to private agents, then our ￿ndings are
weakened considerably. In particular, the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null in our
complete information model is relatively small; i.e., in the order of 10%-15% for the sample
sizes commonly employed.
Given the ink that has been spilled on the subject, we do not view it implausible to
think of monetary policy as often operating in a less than transparent manner. Of course,
even if this is true, our results do not prove that individuals do, in fact, form their in￿ ation
expectations rationally. But we do think that our ￿ndings provide an important caveat
for those who are perhaps a little too eager to interpret visual and statistical evidence as
contrary to the rational expectations hypothesis.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 28
Appendix 1
On the Optimality of the Kalman Filter
The Kalman ￿lter produces the best forecast of the future monetary policy disturbances
￿t out of the class of linear ￿lters. In principle, better forecasts may be achievable through
the use of a nonlinear ￿lter. This fact raises the possibility that the rejections of H0 reported
in the text (in the incomplete information case only) may to some extent be the product of
our restriction on the form of the optimal learning rule. Here, we try to evaluate the extent
to which our restriction to a linear ￿lter constitutes a reasonably good approximation.
The question we ask here is whether agents in our model, in forming their expectations
with the Kalman ￿lter, could have systematically improved on their forecasts. To this end,
de￿ne vt as the error that agents make when forecasting the monetary policy disturbance ￿t;
where
vt = ￿t ￿ Et￿1 [￿t] = ￿t ￿
￿










Next, estimate the following additional regression on each generated sample of data:
vt+1 = ￿1(L)￿t + ￿2(L)(￿t)
2 + ￿3(L)(￿t)
3 + ￿4(L)￿t￿t￿1 + et;
where ￿i(L); for i = 1;2;3;4 are polynomials in the lag operator. We then test the null
hypothesis:
^ H0 : ￿1(L) = ￿2(L) = ￿3(L) = ￿4(L) = 0:
The appropriate lag length for each simulation is the Schwarz (Bayesian) criterion. If this
null hypothesis is rejected very often, or if it is always rejected when H0 itself is rejected, this
would suggest that our linear ￿lter is at the source of our reported rejections of unbiasedness
(H0); rather than incomplete information and rational learning about the monetary policyAre In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 29
shifts.
The following table demonstrates that our restriction to a linear ￿lter is not the main
driver behind our results. The table reports, for our benchmark calibration (both complete
and incomplete information environments), the frequency at which the null ^ H0 was rejected
(￿rst column) and the frequency at which both H0 and ^ H0 were jointly rejected (second and
third columns). Recall that even if there are no possible gain in forecasting, correcly-sized
tests would still reject ^ H0 5% of the cases.
Insert Table 7 here
The table above shows that ^ H0 was rejected in 5.8% of the simulations under complete
information, with H0; ^ H0 jointly rejected in only 1.2% of the cases, whether the forecast
horizon is k = 1 or k = 4. Under incomplete information, ^ H0 is rejected slightly more
frequently (9.8%); however, H0; ^ H0 is jointly rejected much less often, in less than 5% of the
cases. These results show that only a small fraction of the rejections of the unbiasedness
hypothesis we report can be attributed to the ￿quasi-rationality￿of the Kalman ￿lter.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 30
Appendix 2
Year-over-Year Forecast Horizon
In the main body of the paper, we restricted attention to testing the null using a regression
based on one-quarter-ahead expectations (i.e., k = 1 in equation 1). However, tests in the
literature are often performed using a year-over-year horizon. As we demonstrate here, the
choice of the forecast horizon can further increase the probability of incorrectly rejecting the
null (in small samples); overall, however, the results discussed in the paper continue to hold.
Tables 7 and 8 report the results of our Monte Carlo experiment for the economic model
under complete and incomplete information, for the four-quarter-ahead expectations (k = 4)
case.24
Insert Table 8 here
Insert Table 9 here
24With year-over-year expectations (k = 4), the sample observations overlap because the frequency of the
data is quarterly while the forecast horizon is one year. This overlap induces serial correlation of up to three
lags, even under complete information. We continue to correct for serial correlation in a ￿ exible manner by
using the Newey and West, 1994, method. Results are robust to using alternative kernel de￿nitions (uniform,
Bartlett) and maximal lag lengths.Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 31
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Table 1
Testing for Unbiasedness (Thomas, 1999)
^ a0 ^ a1 ￿2(2) Signi￿cance
1960.1￿ 1980.2 0:62 1:29 18:11 0:000
1980.3￿ 1997.4 0:13 0:88 9:37 0:009
1960.1￿ 1997.4 0:13 1:12 2:30 0:317
Table 2
Tests under Complete Information (Empirical Model)
Sample size T 80 160 250 1000
^ a0 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
^ a1 0.9663 0.9772 0.9894 0.9982
% times H0 is rejected 12.3% 10.5% 8.5% 8.1%
Table 3
Tests under Incomplete Information (Empirical Model)
Sample size T 80 160 250 1000
^ a0 0.0035 0.0015 0.0008 0.0003
^ a1 0.7004 0.8767 0.9331 0.9868
% times H0 is rejected 40.8% 28.0% 21.6% 13.7%Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 36
Table 4: Business Cycle Statistics
U.S. Economy vs. Benchmark Model
Variable (x) ￿(x) ￿(x;GDP) ￿(x;x￿1)
Data Model Data Model Data Model
GDP 1.60 1.58 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.52
Consumption 1.24 0.90 0.88 0.91 0.85 0.32
Investment 5.00 2.03 0.91 0.73 0.90 0.90
Hours 1.86 0.93 0.89 0.97 0.90 0.48
In￿ ation 0.49 0.38 0.33 0.66 0.31 0.44
Expected In￿ ation 0.12 0.28 0.49 0.59 0.55 0.56
TFP 0.74 0.64 0.68 0.56 0.71 0.69
Table 5
Tests Under Complete Information (Economic Model)
Sample size T 80 160 250 1000
^ a0 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000
^ a1 0.9609 0.9797 0.9900 0.9975
% times H0 is rejected 14.1% 10.6% 8.9% 6.7%Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 37
Table 6
Tests Under Incomplete Information (Economic Model)
Sample size T 80 160 250 1000
^ a0 0.0013 0.0006 0.0004 0.0001
^ a1 0.8778 0.9436 0.9688 0.9934
% times H0 is rejected 27.6% 24.2% 19.4% 11.9%
Table 7
Frequency of Rejections of ^ H0
% times ^ H0 is rejected % times ^ H0 and H0 are rejected
(k = 1) (k = 4)
Complete Information 5.8% 1.2% 1.2%
Incomplete Information 9.8% 4.4% 4.7%
Table 8
Tests under Complete Information (Economic Model, k = 4)
Sample size T 80 160 250 1000
^ a0 0.0009 0.0005 0.0003 0.0001
^ a1 0.9138 0.9525 0.9765 0.9937
% times H0 is rejected 15.6% 9.5% 6.2% 3.3%Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 38
Table 9
Tests under Incomplete Information (Economic Model, k = 4)
Sample size T 80 160 250 1000
^ a0 0.0026 0.0013 0.0008 0.0002
^ a1 0.7513 0.8834 0.9376 0.9859
% times H0 is rejected 31.6% 19.3% 12.0% 3.3%Are In￿ ation Expectations Rational? 39
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